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DICTA

What Divorce Statutes Are Now in Effect

in Colorado?
BY HAROLD B.

WAGNER*

The war work committee of the American Bar Association recently asked for a short digest of the Colorado laws on divorce. On first
thought this seemed simple to prepare; all that was necessary was to
make a digest or summary of the first thirty-two sections of Chapter 56,
1935 C. S. A. A little investigation, however, soon indicated that there
was a divergence of opinion on the subject among various members of
the bar, particularly on two points:
First: Since Section 9 of Chapter 56 contains provisions for appointment of an attorney for a defaulting defendant, trial by jury, and
the necessity for the plaintiff's personal presence at the trial. Is this section now the law, or has part or all of it been repealed?
Second: When the summons is to be published, may we follow the
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, or does the code still govern?
FIRST POINT

The effectiveness of Section 9 appears to have been in doubt for a
long time. A review of the history of our legislation is necessary for an
understanding of the problem and its solution. In 1893 the legislature
passed an act on the subject of divorce and alimony, complete with specifications of the grounds, practice, procedure, etc. Section 5 of this act
appeared as Section 2119, R. S. '08, Section 5600, C. L. '21, and Section 9, Chapter 56, 1935 C. S. A. After 1893 there were some minor
changes and in 1915 the legislature passed a new "Act Concerning Marriage and Divorce," (S. L. '15, c. 74) which did not contain all the provisions of Section 5 of the laws of 1893. In 1917 the legislature passed
another act on the subject which appeared to be a complete and workable
unit, likewise omitting some of the provisions of Section 5 of the 1893
law. In 1921 the editors of the COMPILED LAWS included Section 5 of
the 1893 statute with the comment that it was not clear whether certain
of its provisions had been repealed in 1917. A similar comment was
made by the compilers of the 1935 COLORADO STATUTES ANNOTATED.
In support of the continuing validity of Section 5 of the 1893 act
it may be said:
1. None of the later legislation contains any precise words
repealing this section, and certain of its provisions are not in irreconcilable conflict with any particular word or sentence of the later
statutes;
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2. Repeals by implication are not favored;
3. The compilers of the 1921 and 1935 statutes, acting
under legislative authority, carried this section forward as part of
the living law of the state;
4. Several cases have referred to this section as being in effect.
Among these cases are Thum v. Thum, 105 Colo. 352, 355, 978
Pac. (2d) 279 (1939), and Myers v. Myers, 110 Colo. 412, 416,
135 Pac. (2d) 235 (1943).
5. Many of our courts and lawyers have proceeded on the
theory that some parts of this section are in effect.
These considerations all have validity and similar ones have been
used as guides in many instances. Their effect, however, appears to have
been destroyed by the decision in Shaif, et al. v. Shaft, 72 Colo. 184,
186, 210 Pac. 400 (1922). In that case (as distinguished from the
Thum and Myers cases) the question of the effect of the 1917 act on
prior divorce legislation was directly in issue and was definitely passed
upon. Our supreme court held that the 1917 act "* * * covers the whole

subject matter and was intended as a substitute for the former statute,
and for that reason must be deemed a repeal of the earlier act." This
follows the rule of statutory construction that:
Where a later act covers the whole subject matter of earlier
acts, embraces new provisions, and plainly shows that it was intended, not only as a substitute for the earlier acts, but to cover the
whole subject then considered by the legislature, and to prescribe
the only rules in respect thereto, it operates as a repeal of all former
statutes relating to such subject matter. The rule applies not only
where the former acts are inconsistent or in conflict with-the new
act, but also even where the former acts are not necessarily repugnant in express terms, or in all respects, to the new act. 1
The Shaft case was cited with approval in Krogh v. Danielson, 73
Colo. 135, 138, 213 Pac. 996 (1923).
It is generally agreed that the parts of the section in question requiring a jury in any event, and the appointment of an attorney for a2
defaulting defendant, have been repealed by Section 8 of the 1917 act.
Under the Shaft case it seems inescapable that the rest of the present Section 9 has also been repealed and that the plaintiff is not required to be
personally present at the trial of a divorce case.
1

59 C. J. 919 (1932).
'The appointment of attorneys to represent non-appearing defendants is required
by § 1, of Rule XX of the rules of the District Court of the Second Judicial District
(Denver).
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Under normal conditions the question of the plaintiff's personal
appearance at the trial might not be considered as of great practical importance, it being usually feasible for the plainitff to appear. In many
cases this is not true in war time, as the following set of facts will illustrate. Shortly before induction into the army, a young man married a
young woman on the spur of the moment. Returning home on his first
leave, he found that she had not been faithful to him and was chiefly
interested in drawing her allotment of fifty dollars a month. His lawyer
started an action for divorce and obtained personal service on the defendant, but before the waiting period of thirty days was completed
the plaintiff was required to return to his station, apparently without any
further prospect of obtaining a leave prior to going overseas. Many such
cases have contained elements which required the plaintiff's problem to
receive the most sympathetic consideration.
Some of the courts have proceeded on the theory that the section in
question is effective insofar as it requires the personal presence of the
plaintiff at the trial, but they have construed this to mean that the plaintiff's deposition may be taken after jurisdiction over the defendant has
been obtained, and that the reading of this deposition at the trial is the
equivalent of personal presence. Such a construction seems to violate the
plain and simple words of the statute, would be difficult, if not impossible, to support under the authorities, and now seems unnecessary in view
of the holding in the Shaft case.
The propriety of proceedings on the plaintiff's deposition is
strengthened by Section 20, Chapter 56, 1935 C. S. A., which provides
that the validity of a divorce decree may not be questioned after one year
from the date of the interlocutory decree, except for lack of jurisdiction,
or for fraud.
Under the Shaft decision, Sections 21, 22, 23, and 24, Chapter 56,
1935 C. S. A., may not be regarded as effective, but they are not of
fundamental importance. Section 21 provides the circumstances under
which a woman may sue without costs; Section 22 legalizes divorces
granted by a jury of less than six; Section 23 validates decrees which
might have been questioned because of residence, the decisions of other
courts, etc.; and Section 24 sustains divorces granted by the probate
courts.
SECOND POINT

Strict compliance with the law relating to publication of summons
is relatively easy, but failure to comply may result seriously for either or
both of the parties. Section 5 of the present law provides, among other
things:
The court or the judge thereof shall, if satisfied of the good
faith of the plaintiff, cause the summons to be published in the
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same manner and with like effect as is now provided by law for
publication of summons in cases of attachment.
This section was passed in 1917. At. that time the provision for
publishing summons in attachment cases was contained in Section 45 of
the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. This paragraph of the code was later
amended and the 1927 act was carried forward into the 1935 compilation. The corresponding paragraph in the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
is Rule 4 (g) and (h). The code paragraph was the only law on the
subject existing in 1917; ther was no supreme court rule relating to
publication of summons.
The principal differences between the code provision existing in
19 17 and the present rules are these:
1. Under the old procedure the order for publication was
made by the clerk of the court, and not by the judge;
2. It was formerly required that the summons be issued for
ten days and that a return be made thereon that the defendant, after
diligent search, could no tbe found;
3. The affidavit of publication had to be signed by the plaintiff, or one of the plaintiffs, except when the plaintiff was a nonresident or absent from the state, when it could be made by his
attorney; and
4. Under the rule as it existed in 1917, service was not complete until the expiration of ten days from the date of the last publication; whereas, it is now complete on the day of the last publication.
There are other minor differences in wording, but the principal
changes are as set forth above.
It seems clear that the code l5rovision, as it existed in 1917, must be
followed. The rule is:
A statute which refers to and adopts the provisions of a prior
statute is not repealed or affected by the subsequent repeal of the
prior statute.3
Many cases are cited, including the two entitled Schwenhe v. Union
DepotandR. R. Co., 7 Colo. 512, 4 Pac. 905 (1884), and 7 Colo. 521,
5 Pac. 816 (1884). In these cases the court was called upon to pass on
the validity of a special federal statute which adopted certain provisions
of a prior general statute which, in turn, was later repealed. The court
approved the general rule and went on to say:
A local and special statute which adopts, by reference, provisions relating to procedure from an existing general law, is not nec-59 C. J. 937 (1932).
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essarily abrogated or affected by the
subsequent repeal of the act
4
containing the provisions adopted.
The rules of construction laid down in this case have been followed
in a number of subsequent decisions.
The rule is further stated:
As a rule the adoption of a statute by reference is construed
as an adoption of the law as it existed at the time the adopting
statute was passed, and therefore is not affected by any subsequent
modification or repeal of the statute adopted, unless a contrary
intention is clearly manifested. "
Some lawyers hold to the opinion that the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE govern the practice in all our courts of record. The rules themselves do not assume to be this sweeping. Rule 1 (a) states that the
rules govern the procedure in all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil
nature, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule
81. Rule 81 (a) refers to special statutory proceedings, 81 (b) refers
to divorce and separate maintenance, and 81 (c) refers to appeals from
county to district court. Paragraph (b), supra, states:
These rules do not govern procedure and practice in actions in
divorce or separate maintenance insofar as they are inconsistent or
in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by the present
applicable statutes.
It is to be noted that this section omits the following sentence which
is contained in the preceding and parallel section on special statutory
proceedings:
Where the applicable statute provides for procedure under a
former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with these rules.
It has been suggested that Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 108 Colo.
538, 120 Pac. (2d) 641 (1941), states the law as being different from
the conclusions set forth above. In that case the husband, plaintiff in a
divorce case, filed a dismissal before any cross-complaint had been made.
The lower court declined to enter the order of dismsisal and this was
reversed by the supreme court under Rule 41 (a) (1), with the observation:
If we assume that Civil Code Sec. 184 controls, still the case
must be regarded as dismissed.
'Schwenke v. Union Depot and R. R. Co., supra, 7 Colo. at 515.
59 C. J. 1060 (1932).
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The divorce statute itself contains no prov1s1ons for dismissal of
such actions. and the general practice was necessarily followed , in entire
conformance with the recognized laws of divorce and procedurr.
Careful compliance with the laws is indispensable in cases involving
substituted service. Non-compliance with the requirements in any important particular will re.nder void all proceedings dependent on the
court's jurisdiction over the person attempted to be served. It will be
noted that Section 20, Chapter 56, 1935 C. S. A., supra, protects decrees from attack after one year, except cases in which the court did not
obtain jurisdiction of the parties, or for a fraud perpetrated upon the
court. Obviously, it is of utmost importance that the defendant be
before the court. Regardless of what the court may attempt to do, it is
elementary that any decree or judgment against him is void if jurisdiction has not been obtained according to the law. Procedure in divorce
cases should be followed with special care; otherwise bigamy, illegitimacy, litigation over property rights. and other disasters may result.

Book Review
TRAFFIC COURTS. By George Warren, Foreword by Arthur T. Vanderbilt;
1942, Boston; Little, Brown and Company, xxvii, 280, $4.0 0.

This work was sponsored by the National Committee on Traffic
Law Enforcement and was published under the joint auspices of that
body and the National Conference of Judicial Councils. It is one of the
volumes of the judicial administration series of which Roscoe Pound.
formerl y dean of th e Harvard Law School. is editor.
Mr. Warren started a nation-wide survey of traffic courts i.n 193 8.
The present volume is based upon his report of that survey, made in
September, 1940. The survey made by Mr. Warren was thorough and
comprehensive. He h as studied both the traffic laws of each state and the
laws governing the courts that enforce such la ws. The material for the
report was obtained by personal investigation and by conferences w ith
traffic judges and court officials in all the states, supplemented by questionnaires sent to attorneys general. traffic judges and justices o f the
peace.
Many of the problems which led to the making of this survey have
been abated by the train of events accelerated by the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor D ecember 7, 194 I. but they are likely to be revived with
the cessation of hostilities and the consequent ending of tire and gasoline
shortages. In fact, the accident toll in D enver at the turn of the year
makes one doubt that these problems have been diminished.

